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MENTAL COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL WH1I
UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF DRUGS
by Victor G. Haddox,* Bruce H. Gross,**
and Seymour Pollack* * *
The production of tranquilizers1 and other psychopharmaceuticals
has virtually exploded within the past ,twenty years, while illegal drug
use has also increased to epidemic proportions.2 The proliferation
of illegal drug consumption has 'been dramatically reflected in the legal
system; for example, fifty-one percent of criminal cases currently going
to trial in the superior courts of Los Angeles County involve drug re-
lated offenses.' It is not surprising, therefore, that a substantial num-
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of Psychiatry, Law and Behavioral Science, University of Southern California.
1. Haddox & Pollack, Psychopharmaceutical Restoration to Present Sanity (Mental
Competency to Stand Trial), 17 J. FoR. Scr. 568 (1972). The term "tranquilizer" was
first used by Benjamin Rush, M.D., founding father of American psychiatry, in describ-
ing his "tranquilizing chair." The term came into general usage recently, designating
a group of pharmaceutical agents which reduce anxiety and agitation. Unfortunately,
the term continued to be applied to more sophisticated psychopharmacological agents
(Chlorpromazine, etc.) which in addition to reducing anxiety---"tranquilization"--also
possess specific psychopharmaceutical properties which produce remission of clinically
overt psychotic symptoms. Thus "tranquilizer" is a misnomer and tends to mislead and
misinform the psychiatrically unsophisticated into assuming that reduction of anxiety
and agitation is their only function. Note the titles of the following articles as ex-
amples of this misinformation: Buschman & Reed, Tranquilizers and Competency to
Stand Trial, 54 A.B.A.J. 284 (1968); Scrignar, Tranquilizers and the Psychotic Defend-
ant, 53 A.B.A.J. 43 (1967); Tuteur, Tranquilizers and "Recovery to Legal Sanity,"
122 AM. J. PsYCIATRY 220 (1965); Note, The Case of the Tranquilized Defendant,
28 L. L. REV. 265 (1968); Recent Development, The Propriety of Using Tranquilizing
Drugs to Calm a Person to a Point Where He is Competent to Stand Trial, 31 01o
ST. L.J 617 (1970).
2. G. UELM N & V. HADDOx, DRUr ABtsE AND Tn ImAw 9 (1974).
3. "At present, narcotic and dangerous drug cases represent approximately 51% of
the Courts' criminal workload." Report of the Special Judicial Reform Comm., Supe-
rior Court of Los Angeles County, Feb. 1971, at 34.
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ber of defendants are under the influence of mind-altering substances
during some phase of their involvement with the criminal justice sys-
tem.4 Such influence raises serious question as to whether drug in-
fluenced defendants are mentally competent to stand trial.
Because the competency of persons under the influence of mind-
altering substances is becoming a frequently encountered psychiatric-
legal issue5 and because the possibility of involuntary commitment
threatens those found incompetent,8 it is imperative that those con-
4. This viewpoint is substantiated by the dramatically increasing number of attacks
upon convictions because of alleged incompetency to stand trial while under the influ-
ence of drugs.
5. S. Pollack, Manual on Mental Competency to Stand Trial, 1970 (manual of lim-
ited circulation on file at the Institute of Psychiatry, Law and Behaviorial Science, Uni-
versity of Southern California, School of Medicine) [hereinafter cited as Manual].
The issue of mental competency is present throughout all stages of criminal pro-
ceedings, from the time of giving Miranda warnings through mental competency to
stand trial, mental competency to be sentenced and even to be executed. Many of
these procedures involve the waiving of constitutional rights.
In Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), the Court noted that, although the de-
fendant may waive his constitutional rights, the waiver must be made voluntarily,
knowingly, and intelligently. Thus, if a defendant is under the influence of mind-al-
tering substances to the extent that he demonstrates an incapacity to make a free and
unrestrained decision, it follows that the defendant does not have the mental capacity
to waive constitutional rights. Javnor v. United States, 403 F.2d 507 (9th Cir. 1963).
The Supreme Court held in Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963), that if an in-
dividual's will is overcome so that the confession is not the act of a rational intellect
and free will, it will be inadmissible because it is coerced. This coercion may be made
by physical intimidation or psychological pressure, and the Court specifically noted that
it included statements that are drug-induced. Townsend, a heroin addict, was in cus-
tody for robbery. He was undergoing withdrawal symptoms and the police physician
had given him Phenobarbital and Hyoscine (Scopolamine). Ten minutes later, while
under the influence of the mind-altering agents, he confessed to an unrelated murder.
Using the reasoning described above, the Supreme Court reversed Townsend's convic-
tion, believing that his constitutional rights had been denied. Since waivers of constitu-
tional rights are inherently suspect, waivers obtained from individuals under the influ-
ence of mind-altering drugs will most likely be subjected to special judicial scrutiny.
If there is a doubt as to whether a defendant possessed a meaningful capacity to make
a free and independent choice to waive his fifth amendment right against self-incrimi-
nation, it is likely that the court's decision will be similar to that in Logner v. State,
260 F. Supp. 970 (M.D.N.C. 1966). There a defendant intoxicated with alcohol and
an amphetamine (Syndrox) gave statements linking him with a robbery. The court
excluded the statements, holding that the defendant's intoxication had rendered them
involuntary.
6. Comment, Criminal Law-Insane Persons-Competency To Stand Trial, 59
MicH. L. REV. 1078 (1961). Approximately 50% of committed defendants will have
to spend the rest of their lives in a mental hospital. Recent court decisions, such as
Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972), hold that indefinite commitment of a crimi-
nal defendant solely on account of his lack of capacity to stand trial offends the consti-
tutional principles of equal protection and due process. Such a defendant cannot be
held more than the reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether there is
MENTAL COMPETENCY
cerned with criminal-legal proceedings understand the problems re-
lated to such competency determinations. The criminal justice system
must alsQ be -attentive to problems raised when. patient-defendants
claim mental incompetency because they were not given needed medi-
cation.
This Article will analyze the United States Supreme Court ruling
detailing standards for mental competency to stand trial." It will also
analyze the trend of recent decisional law to determine when a hear-
ing is required regarding mental competency to stand trial in those
cases in which the defendant may be under the influence of drugs.
It will discuss whether a defendant may waive his right ,to be mentally
present at a required hearing by voluntarily ingesting drugs and will
further discuss the shifting of the burden of proof from the defendant
to the government when the incarcerated defendant is under the in-
fluence of medication.
For purposes of analysis, cases concerning drug influenced defend-
ants will be divided into three major categories: (1) cases in which
the defendant voluntarily takes a drug or medication prior to or dur-
ing trial; (2) cases in which the detained defendant is administered
medication by a representative of the criminal justice system; and (3)
cases in which the detained defendant is denied needed medication by a
representative of the criminal justice system.
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
Before discussing the three categories -of cases, some fundamental
concepts regarding mental competency to stand trial and the effect of
the use of psychoactive agents on mental competency should 'be pre-
sented. The law deems a defendant mentally incompetent to stand
trial because of his demonstrated mental impairment, not because 'he
is suffering from a specific illness.' The law ds unconcerned with the
cause of his mental impairment" and, instead, directs its attention solely
to the resulting demonstrable effects of his mental impairment upon (a)
a substantial probability that he will attain competency in the foreseeable future. If
it is determined that he will not, the State must either institute civil proceedings appli-
cable to indefinite commitment of those not charged with crime, or release the defend-
ant. Accord, In re Davis, 8 Cal. 3d 798, 505 P.2d 1018, 106 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1973).
7. Haddox & Pollack, Psychopharmaceutical Restoration to Present Sanity (Mental
Competency to Stand Trial), 17 J. FOR. Sci. 568 (1972).
8. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
9. But cf. People v. Rogers, 150 Cal. App. 2d 403, 309 P.2d 949 (1957). See text
accompanying notes 45-48 infra.
10. Townsend v. Bushong, 65 N.E.2d 407 (Ohio 1946).
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the defendant's capacity to understand the charges against him and his
capacity to understand the significance of his involvement with the
criminal justice process, and (b) the defendant's capacity to cooperate
with counsel in his defense." As expressed in United States v.
Chisolm:'
2
Physicians may disagree as to the diagnosis of the disease, but we have
little to do with mere names. The real question is: Does the mental
impairment of the prisoner's mind, if such there be, whatever it is, dis-
able him, under the rules I have already given you, from fairly pre-
senting his defense, whatever it may be, and make it unjust to go on
with his trial at this time, or is he feigning to be in that condition,
which, if true, renders him unfit to be kept on trial at this time?' 8
The law is concerned, however, with the manner in which this mental
impairment is induced, i.e., the way in which it is brought about.
Many legalists and psychiatrists' 4 still do not understand that mental
incompetency to stand trial is defined in terms of demonstrable mental
impairment, not in terms of mental illness, per se. Statutory language
has compounded -this confusion because most statutes speak generally
in terms of sanity and insanity. Moreover, statutes have provided little
or no guidelines for defining the critical levels of mental impairment,
that is, identifying that critical threshold level that separates mental
competency to stand trial from mental incompetency.
The case of Dusky v. United States'5 is one of the few appellate
opinions that directs itself to the critical threshold level of mental im-
pairment that basically differentiates the defendant who is mentally
incompetent to stand trial from the party who is competent. In this
case, the Supreme Court did not direct itself to the issue of causes
of mental impairment or to the manner in which the impairment was
produced, but only to the standard that the impairment must assume
to dictate a finding of mental incompetency.
At Dusky's competency hearing, the trial court found him to be
mentally competent to stand trial because the judge believed that Dusky
had the capacity in a factual sense to understand both his relationship
to the criminal justice system and to -the circumstances of the offenses
charged against him,' 6 'and that Dusky also had the capacity to cooper-
11. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
12. 149 F. 284 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1906).
13. Id. at 289.
14. See Manual, supra note 5, at 55.
15. 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
16. The Dusky case is further described in A. MATHEWS, MENTAL DISABILITY AND
THE CUMAL LAW 103-22 (1970) [hereinafter cited as MATHEws].
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ate in a factual sense with his counsel in the preparation of his de-
fense.1
7
At the competency hearings the government's psychiatric expert
witnesses were of the unanimous opinion that Dusky was so mentally
impaired by his mental illness that he could not adequately assist coun-
sel in the preparation of his defense.18 They maintained that Dusky
had hallucinated, 19 was delusional,20 -and had paranoid ideas;2' but in
the hearing on appeal the psychiatrist admitted he had not specifically
explored how this evidence of irrationality related to Dusky's com-
petency to stand trial.22 The appellate court noted what it considered
to be inconsistencies in expert testimony in that an expert witness ad-
mitted that Dusky actually understood the charges against him and that
most of the information that Dusky conveyed about the alleged of-
fenses was factually accurate. 23 As was pointed out by the Solicitor
General, the mental competency standard applied by the hearing
judge, and apparently adopted by the appellate court, varied from the
standard applied by the psychiatrists:
[I]f the judge meant to say that it is sufficient that the defendant be
oriented to time and place and have some recollection of events, -we
think that the test he applied was too narrow. For example, we do
not think that a defendant whose thinking is wholly colored by an in-
sane delusion should be considered competent to assist in his defense
even though much of the information which he could convey would be
factually accurate. The test must be whether he has sufficient present
ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding-and whether he has a rational as well as factual un-
derstanding of the proceedings against him. Although, as noted at the
outset, we think that some of the items mentioned by the doctor (such
as the facts that defendant felt that the charges were a plot and that
his story varied a little) do not show such lack of rational understand-
ing, and suggest that perhaps the doctors were applying too broad a
standard, we are not certain that the court was not applying too narrow
a standard.24
In this borderline case, with the record not presenting a great deal
of information, the United States Supreme Court was probably influ-
17. Id. at 109-11.
18. Id. at 105-08.
19. Id. at 104, 107-08.
20. Id. at 106-08.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 113.
23. Id. at 119.
24. Solicitor General's Brief at 11, Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960)
[hereinafter cited as Solicitor General's Brief].
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enced by 'the "unanimous conclusion of the disinterested government
psychiatrists. 25  Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded from the
argument presented by the Solicitor General that "the reports and the
testimony do afford a substantial basis for the conclusion of incompe-
tency, particularly the testimony as to hallucinations and the need for
medication."2 6  The Supreme Court accepted the Solicitor Generars
argument that, "[A] trial judge ought, at a minimum, [to] have other
expert opinion before he undertakes to disregard the unanimous con-
clusion of disinterested experts. '2 7 The Court sent the case back for
a rehearing, stressing that the threshold of competency to stand trial
was "not only the orientation of the defendant and his recollection of
facts, but his ability to understand and convey facts with a reasonable
degree of rationality.
'28
By these words, the United States Supreme Court defined the thresh-
old level of understanding for mental competency to stand trial. It
set the critical threshold level above "factual understanding" which by
itself would not suffice to qualify for mental competency to stand trial.
A higher level of understanding, that of "reasonable understanding"
or understanding with a "reasonable degree of rationality," is neces-
sary. Furthermore, if rational understanding were impaired by drugs,
hallucinations, or delusions, such impaired understanding would also
negate the defendant's mental competency; however, any such evi-
dence of irrationality would have to be intimately related to the issue of
competency to stand trial.
In many ways, evidence of rational understanding is difficult to dis-
tinguish from that of factual understanding. The distinction is perhaps
best illuminated by an examination of the factual context in Dusky.
20
Milton Dusky, a thirty-one year old man, was charged on September 10,
1958, with violating section 1201 of Title 18 of the United States
Code30 by transporting in interstate commerce a girl who had been
25. Id. at 12.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. MATHEws, supra note 16.
30. Section 1201 then provided in pertinent part:
Whoever knowingly transports in interstate or foreign commerce, any person
who has been unlawfully seized, confined, inveigled, decoyed, kidnaped, abducted,
or carried away and held for ransom or reward or otherwise, except, in the case
of a minor, by a parent thereof, shall be punished (1) by death if the kidnaped
person has not been liberated unharmed, and if the verdict of the jury shall so
recommend, or (2) by imprisonment for any term of years or for life, if the death
penalty is not imposed.
Act of Aug. 6, 1956, ch. 971, § 1201, 70 Stat. 1043.
[Vol. 7
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kidnapped."' Dusky, in the company of two teenage youths, Leonard
Dischart, age fourteen, and Richard H. Nixon, age sixteen, had en-
countered the victim while she was walking to a neighborhood drug
store to have lunch with another girl.31 She accepted their invitation
to drive her to the drug store.3" She had met Nixon before, knew
Dischart casually, but did not know Dusky.3 4 Dusky and his young
companions discharged the victim at the drug store and then went to
a nearby drive-in where they drank vodka supplied by Dusky.8 5 They
discussed -the possibility of having sexual relations with the girl36 and
subsequently returned to the drug store to wait for her. 7 They offered
to drive her home when she left the store.3 8  Although refusing at
first, 3 she subsequently accepted their invitation.
40
Dusky drove the car from Ruskin Heights, Missouri, into the neigh-
boring state of Kansas. 41 After having stopped -the car on a back road,
using a small knife as a threat, the two young boys Taped the victim.
42
Dusky was unsuccessful in his attempt to have intercourse with her43
and then drove all of them back to the original drive-in in Missouri
where the victim escaped. 44  As she reported her abduction and rape
to the employees of the drive-in, Dusky and his young friends drove
away.45  Dusky and Disch'art were arrested the following evening.46
Having experienced some difficulty consulting with Dusky in an ef-
fort to prepare his defense, Dusky's attorney was convinced that Dusky
was incompetent to stand trial;47 accordingly, he was committed to the
Federal Medical Center at Springfield, Missouri, for an examination.48
Four months after his commitment, a court hearing was held to deter-
mine his competency to stand trial.49
31. Solicitor General's Brief, supra note 24, at 6-7.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. MATmHWs, supra note 16, at 103.
48. Id.
49. Id.
1974]
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At this hearing, the government psychiatrist from the Federal Medi-
cal Center testified that Dusky was not mentally competent to stand
trial.5 Dusky was given a diagnosis of schizophrenic reaction, chronic
undifferentiated -type.5 The psychiatrist described Dusky's long his-
tory of mental difficulty with gross mnaladjustment which began some-
time during his childhood.52 Psychological test reports at the Federal
Medical Center described Dusky as suffering from
inadequacy, anxiety, impulsiveness, poor reality contact, lack of ego
strength, auditory and visual hallucintions, depression, nervous ten-
sion, morbid preoccupation with hostility, suicide, murder, sexual in-
dulgence succumbing to a state of insanity.
53
Dusky was placed on Thorazine in therapeutic dosages. 4  This sig-
nificantly improved his mental state, -and when receiving adequate
amounts of Thorazine, his mental state appeared relatively unim-
paired;55 but he had episodes of paranoid thinking and behavior and
disruption of ego function when his medication was discontinued. 0
The government psychiatrist's testimony indicated that Dusky un-
derstood the criminal charges against him and comprehended his legal
predicament -as well as the court's role and function, " but the psychia-
trist maintained -that the defendant was unable to assist his attorney
in his defense. 58  The following line of inquiry by the judge is ex-
tracted from the transcript of the hearing. (Dr. A: the psychiatrist;
Mr. D: the defense attorney; Mr. P: the prosecuting United States
attorney; and Judge J: the trial judge.) These excerpts are extracted
from different parts of the hearing transcript in order to highlight the
specific issue under consideration: 59
Judge J: [1] would like for you to point out to me why, under the
circumstances, he [Dusky] would be unable to assist his counsel
in preparing a defense to this particular charge.
,Dr. A: First, this man is mentally ill. His illness is
Judge J: [D]o. . .you subscribe to the premise that simply because
a man is mentally ill. .. he is unable to work with his counsel
in preparing a defense to a charge that might be against him?
50. Id. at 103-22.
51. Id. at 103.
52. Id. at 104.
53. Id. at 107 n.6.
54. Id. at 115-17.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 104-05.
58. Id. at 109.
59. Id. at 103-19.
[Vol. 7
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Dr. A: Not just the fact that he is mentally ill, but the character of
his mental illness.
Dr. A: The character of this man's mental illness is such that his
thinking is distorted. He does not have realistic thinking, he is
unable to add two and two, figuratively speaking, and come up
with the proper conclusion.
Judge J: We are not concerned with conclusions now. We are con-
cerned with whether or not he knows that this figure is two, and
this figure is two. One of the reasons he has attorneys is to ar-
rive at the proper total of four. Now, let's don't talk for the
moment about his ability to reach conclusions. Let's talk about
his -ability to recite facts.
Dr. A: Your Honor, in interpreting facts, which we understand as
facts, the statement of the patient that this might be a fact, might
not be true because of his distorted thinking, his defective reason-
ing and judgment, and his inability to interpret realistically any-
thing -which is going on. That doesn't apply to everything but
there are certain areas, which I am unable to define accurately,
just where his thinking is distorted other than in the terms of de-
lusions and hallucinations as part of his mental illness.
Judge J: [Y]ou said 'that one reason why he was not, in your opin-
ion, capable of properly assisting in his own behalf was the fact
that he was mentally ill.
Dr. A: Yes.
Judge J: Now, what else?
Dr. A: This 'was in terms-I was going to then define -what I meant
as far -as his mental illness is concerned-
Judge J: All right.
Dr. A: -that it affects his reasoning, his judgment, his interpre-
tation of what is going on about him and his ability to answer
questions and respond to his attorney or others as a witness. This
man's statement cannot be taken to be factual when he is unable
to differentiate reality from unreality.
Judge J: Well, now, getting back to the conversations you have had
with him as basis for formulating your opinion here about his
mental illness as it relates to the precise incident which furnishes
,the basis of this charge, what statements did he make to you that
might demonstrate to us his inability to describe those circum-
stances and those events?
Dr. A: . .. [Very little of the actual decisions that I have made in
my own mind are based on information relative to the offense.
1974"1
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In other words, when this man tells me that we have a microphone
in his room behind the radiator by which we are calling him bad
names, this is not concerned with the offense whatsoever; this is
part of my mental examination and [my] interpretation of the
mental illness, which is of such severity that he is unable to reason
or interpret accurately.60
Judge J: He was at this date, and in your opinion I believe you testi-
fied, still is oriented as to time, place and person?
Dr. A: Yes.
Judge J: He realizes he is in court today, he realizes that he was
down there pursuant to a Court order for psychiatric examination?
Dr. A: Yes.
Judge J: He knows who his attorney is, he knows what he is charged
with having done?
Dr. A: Yes.
Judge J: And to some extent at least he knows some, or expresses
a knowledge of some of the incidents leading up to the commission
of the offense that he is alleged to have committed?
Dr. A: Yes, sir. . 61
Judge J: . . . I am of the opinion that the evidence that has been
developed thus far, showing as it does that the defendant is ori-
ented as to time and place and person, understands the nature
of the charge that is pending against him, understands that he is
actually being charged with an offense, understands what that
offense is, and as far as his ability to recite facts is concerned,
in my opinion is able properly to assist in his own defense to the
extent that he can develop those facts with his own attorney, it
is my conclusion that he properly should be kept here and not re-
turned to the Medical Center, and 'that he is competent to stand
trial in the narrow sense of that term as used under Section
4244.12
60. Id. at 111-13.
61. Id. at 115.
62. Id. at 118. The judge's reference is to 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1970), which
provides:
Whenever after arrest and prior to the imposition of sentence or prior to the
expiration of any period of probation the United States Attorney has reasonable
cause to believe that a person charged with an offense against the United States
may be presently insane or otherwise so mentally incompetent as to be unable to
understand the proceedings against him or properly to assist in his own defense,
he shall file a motion for a judicial determination of such mental competency of
the accused, setting forth the ground for such belief with the trial court in which
proceedings are pending. Upon such a motion or upon a similar motion in behalf
[Vol. 7
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The federal standard articulated by the United States Supreme
Court in Dusky directed itself to the critical threshold level of mental
impairment:
[T]he "test must be whether [the defendant] has sufficient present abil-
ity to consult with his lawyer 'with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding-and whether he has a rational as well as factual under-
standing of the proceedings against him."1
63
When the Solicitor General's brief and the above quoted transcript
material are considered, it becomes apparent that the United States
Supreme Court's opinion in Dusky substantially clarified prior ambigu-
ity regarding -the legal definition of understanding as this term relates
to the issue of mental competency -to stand trial. The -trial court and
the appellate court assumed -that a higher threshold level of mental
impairment -than that eventually enunciated by the Supreme Court was
necessary before a defendant could be found mentally incompetent to
stand trial. The trial court believed that if the defendant had the
capacity to identify facts, i.e., if he could recognize "2" as "2," this
capacity would qualify him as mentally competent to stand trial; it was
not necessary that the defendant be able to reason rationally with these
facts, i.e., the defendant need not be able to add "2 + 2" and
arrive at a total of "4." Under the trial court's standard, the defend-
ant was competent to stand trial even though he was incapable of rea-
soning logically from a simple premise to a simple conclusion. The
trial court assumed that the defendant's attorney could apply this level
of reasoning to facts supplied by the defendant; therefore, it was un-
necessary that the defendant himself possess a similar degree of ra-
tionality. If, however, the defendant was unable to supply these facts,
he would presumably be incompetent to stand trial.
of the accused, or upon its own motion, the court shall cause the accused whether
or not previously admitted to bail, to be examined as to his mental condition by
at least one qualified psychiatrist, who shall report to the court. For the purpose
of the examination the court may order the accused committed for such reasonable
period as the court may determine to a suitable hospital or other facility to be
designated by the court. If the report of the psychiatrist indicates a state of pres-
ent insanity or such mental incompetency in the accused, the court shall hold a
hearing, upon due notice, at which evidence as to the mental condition of the ac-
cused may be submitted, including that of the reporting psychiatrist, and make a
finding with respect thereto. No statement made by the accused in the course of
any examination into his sanity or mental competency provided for by this section,
whether the examination shall be with or without the consent of the accused, shall
be admitted in evidence against the accused on the issue of guilt in any criminal
proceeding. A finding by the judge that the accused is mentally competent to
stand trial shall in no way prejudice the accused in a plea of insanity as a defense
to the crime charged; such finding shall not be introduced in evidence on that issue
nor otherwise be brought to the notice of the jury.
63. 362 U.S. at 402-03 (emphasis added), quoting Solicitor General's Brief, supra
note 13, at 11.
1974] 435
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As was previously mentioned, the Supreme Court set the critical
threshold for mental incompetency at a lower level than did the trial
court and the court of appeals.6 4 The Supreme Court held that in
order to be mentally competent to stand trial a defendant must have
a capacity for a reasonable degree of rational understanding. Even
though expert testimony in the Dusky case indicated that Dusky under-
stood the charges against him, his legal predicament, the purpose of
his psychiatric examination, and his relationship with the court, the
attorneys and the psychiatrist, the Supreme Court held that Dusky
lacked this critical capacity (as described in Dr. A's testimony).
The legal standard for mental competency to stand -trial thus be-
comes clearer in that a base line for impairment of reasoning ability
is now established. The defendant's capacity for reasoning is high-
lighted as a qualitative criterion, and the point at which his reasoning
capacity is sufficiently impaired to prevent him from standing trial
is set at that point where he is unable 'to consult with his lawyer with
a reasonable degree of rational understanding 6" and is incapable of
"a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against
him." 6  In other words, mental impairment to the extent that simple
conclusions could not rationally be developed from readily identified
simple premises would henceforth qualify for mental incompetency to
stand trial. The defendant's capacity for factual understanding as
manifested by his capacity to be "oriented to time and place" and his
capacity for "some recollection of events," is a necessary but not a suffi-
cient standard for mental competency to stand trial.
In previous articles67 it has been suggested that: (1) The threshold
level of mental impairment for incompetency to stand trial is arbitrary
and is defined by social policy to fulfill social needs through law; (2)
a high threshold level of mental impairment is required for mental
incompetency to stand trial;" and (3) the social policy leading to a high
64. See notes 15-62 supra and accompanying text.
65. 362 U.S. at 402.
66. Id.
67. Haddox & Pollack, Psychopharmaceutical Restoration to Present Sanity (Mental
Competency to Stand Trial), 17 J. FOR. Sci. 568 (1972); Pollack, Principles of For-
ensic Psychiatry for Psychiatric-legal Opinion-making, in LEGAL MEDICINE ANNUAL
(C.H. Wecht ed. 1971); Manual, supra note 5.
68. In the prior discussion of Dusky (see text accompanying notes 24-26 supra)
it was seen that the threshold level of mental impairment for mental incompetency to
stand trial was set by the court at that degree of mental dysfunction at which the de-
fendant was incapable of reasoning rationally from valid identified premises to logical
simple conclusions. This level itself connotes a considerable degree of mental impair-
ment; that is, a relatively high threshold level of mental impairment is identified rather
than a low threshold level.
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threshold level of mental impairment for incompetency is derived from
a number of interrelated factors such as the presumption of mental
competency -to stand -trial, the accused's constitutional right to a speedy
trial, and the pressures from the over-crowded system of criminal justice
to process defendants through the system as quickly as possible.0 9
However, no prior article on mental competency to stand trial has
highlighted the significant contribution of the Dusky case -to the estab-
lishment of a base line level of mental impairment necessary to identify
mental incompetency. Most psychiatrists apparently believe that the law
is silent on the degree of mental impairment necessary for a finding
of incompetence -to stand trial.70
MENTAL COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL WmLE UNDER
THE INFLUENCE OF DRUGS
Just as courts are concerned with .the individual's kind and degree
of impairment, rather than the type of illness causing the impairment,
so should -they be concerned with the specific effects of the use of
drugs rather than with the mere fact that drugs are used. In both con-
texts the courts should focus on the effects rather than on the causes.
Courts generally have shown a propensity to erroneously focus on
the causes of mental impairment, rather than on its identification.
Frequently, pharmaceutical agents prescribed by psychiatrists reduce
mental disturbance with the result that increased mental competency
can be demonstrated. 71 On other occasions, these same pharmaceuti-
cal agents may produce or increase mental impairment leading -to men-
tal incompetency to stand trial. This apparent paradox has led to con-
fusion, giving some judges, attorneys, and psychiatrists the impression
that a defendant who is under the influence of drugs is necessarily
mentally incompetent to stand trial. This approach is obviously erron-
eous because it could lead to a conclusion that a defendant is incompe-
tent to stand trial because he is under the influence of drugs even
though those same drugs may be the influencing agents that actually
(1) improve the defendant's ability to comprehend the significance of
his involvement with the criminal justice system and (2) improve his
69. It is beyond the scope of this Article to scrutinize the many other factors in-
volved in the standard of mental competency to stand trial established by statutes or
courts, or to challenge the application of this policy in requiring a high threshold level
of impairment as a condition precedent to a finding of mental incompetency to stand
trial.
70. Manual, supra note 5.
71. Haddox & Pollack, Psychopharmaceutical Restoration to Present Sanity (Mental
Competency to Stand Trial), 17 J. FoR. Sci. 568, 571 (1972).
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ability to cooperate rationally with counsel in the preparation of his
defense. It is thus suggested that an application of a "per se rule" con-
cerning drug use and influence is too simplistic and that each case should
be determined by applying the Dusky two-pronged test of mental im-
pairment to the particular defendant.
A. Cases in Which the Defendant Voluntarily
Uses a Drug Prior to or During Trial
One identifiable major category of defendants is that of accused per-
sons who use drugs immediately before or during trial. These indi-
viduals may or may not be in custody but their use of drugs is volun-
tary, intentional, and self-administered, iie., not administered by a
representative of the criminal justice system.
The courts have generally used a reasonable application of the two-
pronged test in disposing of cases involving such defendants. More-
over, they have uniformly held that: (1) the use of narcotics does not,
by itself, render a person incompetent and (2) the defendant has the
burden of producing evidence to raise a bona fide doubt as to his com-
petency when he claims on appeal -that the trial court should have held
a competency hearing sua sponte. Although no cases are found in-
volving a denial of a request for a hearing at the trial level, general
mental competency rules which require a hearing whenever a doubt
is raised in the mind of the court would be clearly applicable in this
context.
United States v. Tom7" and Heard v. United States73 illustrate the
approach taken by the courts in this area. In Tom, it was argued on
appeal that due to the influence of narcotics, petitioner had been un-
able to understand the nature of the charges against him or 'to assist
in his own defense during the trial and thus was denied his constitu-
tional right to due process. 74 The court responded:
It appears not to be disputed that Tom was taking narcotics at
the time of the trial. But the record does not show, and we have no
reason to believe, that the use of narcotics per se renders a defendant
incompetent to stand trial. Whether it had such an effect in this case
was an issue of fact, as to which the petitioner had the burden of
proof ....
There is adequate evidentiary support for Judge Edelstein's con-
clusion that the petitioner did not sustain the burden of proving his in-
72. 340 F.2d 127 (2d Cir. 1965).
73. 263 F. Supp. 613 (D.D.C. 1967).
74. 340 F.2d at 127-28.
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competency. Norman Lau Kee, Esq., who represented Tom at the
trial and had known him for a number of years, noticed "nothing un-
usual" in his appearance or demeanor at trial, and he testified that Tom
"appeared to respond to my questions without too much difficulty."
These observations were supported by the testimony of Mr. Rosner,
who had represented the government, and Leslie Hall, a medical techni-
cian who had talked with Tom at the close of the trial. In addition, Tom
conceded that 'he had worked evenings as a dealer in a card game dur-
ing the course of the trial, and his statements at the time of sentencing
do not indicate that he was then incompetent.7 5
In Heard, the issue raised was whether petitioner's recognized ad-
diction to narcotics (together with other vague allegations of mental
abberration) required the trial court to order ,a hearing for mental
competency sua sponte.76  The appellate court denied petitioner's
motion to vacate his conviction, 77 finding that petitioner had not pre-
sented enough evidence to raise a bona fide doubt concerning his com-
petency.78  The factual material presented by petitioner was held to
amount to nothing more than "the bare fact of his recognized addic-
tion -to narcotics over a long period of years and certain nebulous alle-
gations that his behavior at trial evidenced incompetency.
'7
Petitioner's allegations were contradicted by his conduct in submit-
ting to his attorney and the judge a list of doctors whom he desired to
subpoena.8 0 This action was described by the court as an action which
"demonstrated a reasonable degree of rational understanding both as
to the proceedings -against him and as to the -tactical presentation of
an insanity defense."' '
At first glance, the two preceding cases, and the line of cases which
they represent, might seem invalid because defendants were not en-
,titled to a hearing sua sponte although they were admittedly taking
drugs during trial. However, these cases are medically sound as use
of drugs does not, per se, render one unable -to understand ,the charges
against him or render one unable to cooperate with counsel in his de-
fense. Chief Judge Bazelon discusses this specific issue in Hansford
v. United States: 2
75. Id. at 127-28 (emphasis added and citations omitted).
76. 263 F. Supp. at 617.
77. Id. at 618.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 616.
80. Id. at 617.
81. Id.
82. 365 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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Current medical knowledge indicates that use of narcotics often
produces a psychological and physiological reaction known as an acute
brain syndrome, which is a "basic mental condition characteristic of dif-
fuse impairment of brain tissue function." The characteristic symptoms
of the syndrome are impairment of orientation; impairment of memory;
impairment of all intellectual functions including comprehension, cal-
culation, knowledge and learning; impairment of judgment; and lability
and shallowness of affect.8
3
However, Judge Bazelon continued:
This is not, of course, to say that a defendant under the influence of
narcotics is necessarily incompetent. Narcotic use does not invariably
produce an acute brain syndrome, nor is every syndrome of the same
degree of severity. The effects of narcotic use -will vary depending on
the amount of drugs taken, the degree of tolerance developed by the
individual, and the idiosyncratic reaction of the person to the drugs.
84
Medically speaking, although an organic brain syndrome may be
present (and if severe enough would make the defendant mentally
incompetent to stand trial), the great majority of narcotic influenced
defendants do not experience the acute brain syndrome to the extent
that they are so significantly mentally impaired as to be identified as
mentally incompetent.88
In each of the preceding cases, the court simply found that the evi-
dence pointing to -the likelihood of an impairment was insufficient; the
failure -to call a hearing sua sponte was not error, plain or otherwise.
The psychiatric-medical data adduced above establishes the validity of
a distinction between impairment sufficient to warrant a hearing and
impairment which, though significant, is nonetheless insufficient to war-
rant a hearing. Moreover, it is submitted that an approach calling for
a sua sponte hearing in each case in which drug use is present" would
impose an unmanageable burden on the criminal justice system.8"
83. Id. at 922 (footnote omitted and emphasis added).
84. Id. at 923. See AMERICAN PsYciuATRIc ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTI-
CAL MANuAL: MENTAL DisonRERs 14-15 (1952); A. NoYES & L. KoLB, MODERN
CLnIcAL PSYCHIATRY 86-87 (6th ed. 1963).
85. Opinion of Victor G. Haddox, M.D. (forensic psychiatrist), based upon approx-
imately 500 case interviews of individuals under the influence of narcotics.
86. Such an approach was demanded by the court in Hansford v. United States, 365
F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
87. Approximately 20,000 arrests are made monthly in Los Angeles County on drug-
related offenses (based on communication with John Miner, former Head, Medical-legal
Section, Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office). The already overburdened
courts would be unable to, sua sponte, evaluate and adjudicate every defendant who
might be addicted. An added and insurmountable problem would be the lack of suffi-
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Another identifiable subdivision in ithe category of drug-using de-
fendants is that of persons who use psychologically active drugs with
the specific intent of inducing mental incompetency. Incompetency
to stand trial is the purpose of these defendants' drug use rather than
a by-product of it. In addition -to the problems encountered with other
drug using defendants, the following issue is raised by defendants who
use drugs with the specific intent of inducing incompetency to stand
trial: Does one who voluntarily uses drugs with the intent of render-
ing himself mentally incompetent to stand trial, thereby waive his right
to be mentally present at his trial?
Constitutional guarantees and public policy basic to the issue of
mental competency to stand trial afford the criminal defendant the right
to be present at trial in mind as well as in body. One might question
whether such a basic right can be waived by a defendant's actions. A
criminal defendant unquestionably has the right to rationally and mean-
ingfully waive his constitutional rights; this implies that the defendant
had the capacity to rationally understand his waiver and its conse-
quences. It also implies that the defendant provide the court with ex-
cient psychiatrists to medically-psychiatrically evaluate such a large number of defend-
ants.
Some jurisdictions, e.g., California (CAL. PENAL CODE § 1369 (West 1972)), have
taken the posture that the defendant has the burden of going forward on the issue of
mental competency to stand trial, even though he may not wish to establish incompe-
tency. In order to overturn the denial of a competency hearing, the defendant must pre-
sent the appellate court with sufficient evidence of incompetence to indicate that the trial
judge should have declared a doubt as to the defendant's competence. The cases indicate
that a confirmed history of drug use prior to a legal hearing and prior to trial, and even
undisputed evidence of narcotic use during the trial, are not sufficient, by themselves,
to raise a bona fide doubt as to mental incompetency. If this evidence is insufficient
to raise a doubt as to mental incompetency for the purpose of holding a competency
hearing, it could not, by itself, be considered adequate evidence to demonstrate mental
incompetency to stand trial for the purpose of appellate review.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1369 (West 1972) provides:
The trial of the question of insanity must proceed in the following order:
1. The counsel for the defendant must open the case and offer evidence in sup-
port of the allegation of insanity;
2. The counsel for the people may then open their case and offer evidence in
support thereof;
3. The parties may then respectively offer rebutting testimony only, unless the
Court, for good reason in furtherance of justice, permits them to offer evidence
upon their original cause;
4. When the evidence is concluded, unless the case is submitted to the jury on
either or both sides without argument, the counsel for the people must commence,
and the defendant or his counsel may conclude the argument to the jury;
5. If the indictment be for an offense punishable with death, two counsel on
each side may argue the cause to the jury, in which case they must do so alter-
nately. In other cases the argument may be restricted to one counsel on each side;
6. The court must then charge the jury, stating to them all matters of law nec-
essary for their information in giving their verdict.
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plicit evidence of his waiver. A basic question can be raised as to
whether a criminal defendant can waive his right to be mentally present
at trial absent such explicit waiver. In People v. Rogers, 8 a California
appellate court implicitly assumed that a defendant may waive his con-
stitutional right to be present at trial without making an explicit waiver
to the courts9 and that his actions, by themselves, qualify for such
waiver.90 Other court rulings uphold this position.9
The Rogers case analyzed this question as it relates to drug use.
In Rogers, the court held that one may waive his right to be present
at trial when using medication with the intent of inducing incompe-
tency.92  Rogers, a diabetic, injected a large dose of insulin on the
fourth day of his trial93 and wilfully abstained from eating a sufficient
breakfast.94 As a result, he allegedly experienced insulin shock9" and
during trial stated to the court: "'I don't think I can go on, Your
Honor. I have these blackouts from insulin.' "0
The court pointed out that this condition was largely self-inducedT
and that the defendant by his own actions had impaired his mental state
to the extent that he was unable to assist in his defense. 8 In noting
that Rogers had been granted thirteen previous continuances based
upon ill-health,9 9 the court held that his self-induced insulin shock
amounted to a waiver of the right to be mentally present:
The defendant, by his own actions, induced the condition existing in
the afternoon of the fourth day of the trial. This amounted to a waiver
of the right to be mentally present granted by section 1043 of the [Cali-
fornia] Penal Code. If this were not the rule, many persons, by their own
acts, could effectively prevent themselves from ever being tried. A dia-
betic can put himself in insulin shock by simply taking insulin and then
not eating, or by refusing to eat, or can disable himself by failing to take
insulin. Surely, the Legislature in adopting section 1043 did not intend
such an absurd result. Moreover, in the instant case there is some evi-
dence that the claimed symptoms were feigned. The trial judge saw and
88. 150 Cal. App. 2d 403, 309 P.2d 949 (1957).
89. Id. at 415, 309 P.2d at 957.
90. Id.
91. See cases collected in 23 C.J.S.2d Criminal Law, § 975a, p. 899 (1961); Annot.,
100 A.L.R. 478, 480 (1936); Annot., 1913c Am. Ann. Cas. 1146.
92. 150 Cal. App. 2d at 415, 309 P.2d at 451.
93. Id. at 409, 413, 309 P.2d at 953, 955.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 409, 309 P.2d at 953.
97. Id. at 412-13, 309 P.2d at 955.
98. Id. at 413, 309 P.2d at 955.
99. Id. at 405, 309 P.2d at 950.
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heard the defendant. He heard the doctor's testimony. He could tell
far better than we can tell from a cold record -whether defendant was
able to proceed. 100
A state of mental incompetency that is deliberately self-induced by
a rational defendant for the purpose of inducing his subsequent mental
incompetency suggests that the defendant had the mental capacity for
competency to stand trial; in Rogers the appellate court noted that the
trial court was correctly concerned more with the demonstration of
such mental capacity than with the alleged evidence of mental impair-
ment which was the effect of the defendant's voluntary, rational, and
exploiting act. 101 It appears that the appellate court was more
strongly impressed with the defendant's exploiting and manipulative
maneuvers than with the significance of his mental impairment. The
latter, if at all present, was also considered to be transient and revers-
ible.
It is not known how much weight the appellate court accorded to
the transience and reversibility of Rogers' alleged mental impairment.
It would be interesting to see how the court would deal with the issue
of a defendant who had deliberately shot himself in order to avoid
standing trial, and in so doing had significantly and permanently im-
paired himself mentally so that he would never again be capable of
standing trial. Such an issue, it is submitted, might be resolved by
the defendant being found mentally incompetent to stand trial irre-
spective of the fact that his impaired mental state had resulted from
his voluntary, rational and manipulative act.
B. Cases in Which the Detained Defendant is Administered
Medication by a Representative of the Criminal
Justice System
A second major category of defendants is -that of detained parties
to whom a mind-altering substance is administered by a representative
of the criminal justice system. Although judicial rulings have not ex-
pressly articulated different standards in cases involving such defendants,
it is submitted that there is (and should be) a higher degree of judicial
concern and scrutiny applied in these cases, when on appeal the ques-
tion is raised whether the trial court should have ordered a competency
hearing sua sponte. This point of view is substantiated by the greater
number of cases in this category in which -the courts have vacated sen-
100. Id. at 415, 309 P.2d at 957.
101. Id. at 415-16, 309 P.2d at 957.
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tences. It is also sujpported by language used by the courts in these
cases; this language indicates a high degree of judicial concern when-
ever a representative of the criminal justice system administers a psy-
chologically active substance to the defendant.
The foregoing is aptly demonstrated by Hayes v. United States.10 2
Petitioner alleged that he was incompetent to stand trial because prior
to, during and following the trial he was suffering from .4 mental
derangement which resulted from a heavy sedation by an unknown
narcotic administered to him for physical injuries. 08 He alleged that
it was not until he was confined at the United States Penitentiary,
Leavenworth, Kansas, and given an opportunity to recover from the
heavy sedation of narcotics that he realized that he had been convicted
of a serious crime. 0 4 Petitioner thus argued that his sentence should
be vacated and a competency hearing should be held. 05 The court
observed:
Where a prisoner files a motion under §2255 [28 U.S.C. §2255
(1970), dealing with habeas corpus applications] to vacate his sentence
on the ground of mental incompetency at the trial, the court undoubt-
edly has the right to require him -to set forth a sufficient basis of back-
ground, incidents, or other elements to give indication of the possibility
of such a question. Prisoners, of course, are not entitled and need not
be permitted, after their conviction, to make bald charges of mental
incompetency to stand trial, for the purpose simply of obtaining an ex-
cursion from the penitentiary. But once a prisoner has set out enough
in a §2255 motion to give factual indication of such a possibility in
respect to -his trial, the court must dispose of the question by a hear-
ing.
. . . These allegations of head injuries, arrest beatings and drug
administrations may or may not be true, but they constitute elements,
asserted as facts, of such a character as to be able to raise a possible
question. Appellant's expressions, conduct and actions on the trial may
have capacity to shed some probative light on the question. They can-
not, however, of themselves be declared to be legally conclusive that
no narcotic drugs were administered to appellant, or that, if any such
drugs were administered, they had been of a nature or in amount which
could not have affected his powers and faculties in the trial proceed-
ings.
It is hardly necessary to add that certainty as to the lack of any
mental effects from. drugs upon a defendant in his trial and conviction
102. 305 F.2d 540 (8th Cir. 1962).
103. Id. at 542.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 543.
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is a matter of particular judicial solicitude.1 6
Thus it would appear that when the possibility exists that a defendant
may have become mentally incompetent to stand trial because of some
action of a representative of the criminal justice system, special judicial
concern exists and the court is called upon to handle the case in a special
way. It seems that the burden of going forward with sufficient factual
evidence to require a hearing on mental competency to stand trial is
less when the alleged mental incompetency is induced by a representative
of the criminal justice system.
Manley v. United States'07 is a case directing itself to the burden
of proof. Here, appellant had a documented thirty year history of ad-
diction.10 8  He was arraigned following a two week confinement with-
out drugs.' 0 During a recess, he was visited by a doctor who admin-
istered two injections out of the presence of the attorney. 10  One in-
jection was Numorphan,"' a narcotic, and the other was Largon," -2
a tranquilizer. When court was reconvened, defendant's attorney
stated that he was unable to confer intelligently with -the defendant" 3
and requested his commitment to an institution for a mental exami-
nation. 14  The court inquired whether the defendant had received
medical treatment that day" 5 -and was informed that the defendant
had received "a shot of some type.""' 6 Although neither court nor
counsel knew with certainty the nature of the injections," ' the Assis-
tant United States Attorney mistakenly believed that the injection "was
not a narcotic type"' 8 and so informed the court. Following another
recess, defendant's demeanor had changed sufficiently for his -attor-
ney to inform the court that the defendant was ready for arraign-
ment, 119 and a plea of guilty was entered.'20
The appellate court held that the administration of the drug was
sufficient evidence to require a hearing and the court specifically dis-
cussed the placement of burden of proof:
106. Id. (emphasis added and citation omitted).
107. 396 F.2d 699 (5th Cir. 1968).
108. Id. at 700.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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While it may be that generally the burden of proof is on a defend-
ant to show that he was under the influence of a narcotic to such an
extent that his judgment would be impaired, ...here the govern-
ment's innocent misrepresentation that appellant was not under the in-
fluence of narcotics curtailed proper. . . inquiry by the court, and the
burden of proof of appellant's competence, under these circumstances,
was upon the government.'
21
A high degree of judicial scrutiny exists in issues other than the
limited one of mental competency to stand trial when defendants are
administered psychologically active agents by an employee or agent
of the criminal justice system. This is demonstrated by State v. Mur-
phy,12 in which a drug influenced defendant testified in his own de-
fense. 12  The defendant was convicted of murder in the first de-
gree124 and sentenced to death. 25 During the trial at 8:30 a.m. on
the day the defendant was to testify, a fellow prisoner, who was serv-
ing as medical trustee under the supervision of the jail physician, gave
the defendant Equanil, a minor tranquilizer. 26  At about 9:00 a.m.,
two additional pills of Trancopal, another tranquilizing medication,
were given to the defendant. 127  He was then conducted to the court
room and took his place on the witness stand at about 10:00 a.m.Y2
According to undisputed testimony, the defendant's appearance, de-
meanor, and manner of speaking while on the witness stand were
markedly different from what they had been during the numerous
pretrial interrogations. 9 During this period on the witness stand his
relating of the crime was casual, cool, not at all perturbed.8 0 In-
deed it exhibited a lackadaisical attitude.' 8 ' His attorney stated:
I noticed a change that was beyond comprehension in my humble
opinion as a layman. It was an entirely different approach to the en-
tire stbject matter and I was at a loss to understand it.132
Appellant did not claim that the tranquilizing drugs affected the
content of his testimony.'33 The contention to the trial court, and on
121. Id. at 701 (citation omitted).
122. 355 P.2d 323 (Wash. 1960).
123. Id. at 324.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 325.
127. Id. at 326.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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appeal, was that, but for appellant's cool, casual, and somewhat lacka-
daisical attitude, induced by the tranquilizing drugs, the jury might not
have imposed the death penalty. 3 ' The appellate court granted a
new trial' r because there had been such a significant change in the
defendant's attitude that the jury may have received the erroneous im-
pression that the defendant's attitude toward the crime was callous and
insensitive.1386
The court granted a new trial without any specific finding of de-
fendant's inability to aid counsel or inability to understand the charges
against him. This liberal ruling probably resulted from the court's be-
lief that the state was responsible for an erroneous impression upon
the jury, since one of its representatives administered the medication
which substantially altered the defendant's mental state. Such alteration
in emotional state could be considered equivalent to mental impairment
that could have substantially reduced the defendant's mental capacity
to assist in his own defense by reducing his capacity .to provide more
emotionally appropriate testimony.
It thus appears that if a defendant were to receive a potentially mind-
influencing drug from a representative of the criminal justice system,
whether such drug were given to the defendant with or without his knowl-
edge, understanding, or consent, and irrespective of the reasons for
which such drug might be given to the defendant, the court would hold
greater concern for the defendant's mental competency to stand trial.
Such concern could take the following forms: (1) shifting the burden
of proof on the competency issue from the defendant to the govern-
ment, (2) vacating the decision and ordering that a competency hear-
ing be held, and (3) reversing the decision and ordering a new trial.
We can assume that the court's greater concern for the defendant's
mental competency to stand trial stems from the fact that the defend-
ant is involuntarily confined and can thereby be manipulated and in-
fluenced to his detriment. It is submitted that due process concerns
underlie the greater judicial scrutiny accorded these cases.
C. Cases in Which a Detained Defendant is Denied
Needed Medication by a Representative
of the Criminal Justice System
This third category of cases includes defendants who require cer-
tain medication in order to attain or maintain a level of mental compe-
134. Id.
135. Id. at 377.
136. Id.
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tency. Denial of medication to these defendants will produce mental
incompetency just as supplying medication to the defendants in cate-
gory two produced mental incompetency. There are two subclasses
of cases in which detained patient-defendants who do not receive
needed medication become mentally impaired: (1) those defendants
who require medication to prevent severely disabling drug withdrawal
symptoms' 37 and (2) those patient-defendants who need medication
to improve thought processes impaired by disabling mental dis-
orders.
138
137. Physical dependency on drugs is dramatically demonstrated when, after addiction
is present, the drugs are withheld. The abstinence syndrome thus provoked consists of
dilation of the pupils, twitching of the muscles, goose flesh, lacrimation, rhinorrhea,
yawning, and sneezing. If allowed to continue, the symptoms may become alarmingly
severe, with profuse sweating, elevation of temperature and blood pressure, vomiting, and
dehydration.
Withdrawal symptoms are physiologically determined and have been produced in
dogs, cats, and monkeys, as well as in spinal and cerebral preparations. Wilder, Reac-
tions of Dogs Without Neocortex During Cycles of Addiction to Morphine and Metha-
done, 67 A.M.A. .McH. NEUtROL. & PsYCHATRY 672 (1952). Through the use of
drugs, a new biological dependency similar to thirst or hunger has been created.
A chemically induced abstinence syndrome may be affected with administration of
the drug Nalline (n-allyl-normophine) to a person who is addicted. Nalline is antago-
nistic to the effects of morphine, despite the fact that it is also an opium derivative.
Discovered in 1912 (Weijlard & Erickson, N-allyl-normorphine, 64 J. AM. CHaM. Soc'y
869 (1942)), it is used chiefly by obstetricians who employ it to rid the newborn of
possible lethargic effects from narcotics previously given to the mother.
138. With the advent of accelerated pharmaceutical research and increasing knowl-
edge, compounds have been developed which are therapeutic and effective in treating
mental disorders. In 1953, Chlorpromazine became available in the United States for
purposes of drug investigation; and since that introduction, the antipsychotic "major
tranquilizers" (phenothiazine derivatives), antidepressives, and other psychotropic
agents, as well as the so-called "minor tranquilizers" have become widely prescribed
drugs. See Delay, Deniker & Harl, The Therapeutic Use of a Phenothiazine with Se-
lective Central Action (RP 4560), May 26, 1952, (Centenary Meeting of the Societe
Medico-Psychologique, Paris). See also, Hamon, Paraire & Velluz, Remarques sur l'ac-
tion du 4560 RP sur l'agitation maniaque, 110 ANNALES MEDICO-PSCHOLOOIQUES 331
(1952). The efficacy of these psycho-pharmaceutical agents is well documented
through dramatic shortening of length of hospitalization with readmissions correlated
with cessation of maintenance medication. See Brill & Patton, Analysis of Population
Reduction in New York State Mental Hospitals During the First Four Years of Large-
Scale Therapy with Psychotropic Drugs, 116 AM. J. PS ycHATRY 495 (1960). See also
Engelhardt, et al., Phenothiazines in the Prevention of Psychiatric Hospitalization, 186
I.A.M.A. 981 (1963); Englehardt, et al., Prevention of Psychiatric Hospitalization with
the Use of Psychopharmaceutical Agents, 173 J.A.M.A. 147 (1960); Hobbs, Wanklin &
Ladd, Changing Patterns of Mental Hospital Discharges and Readmissions in the Past
Two Decades, 93 CAN. MED. Ass'N J. 17 (1965); Odegard, Pattern of Discharge from
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MENTAL COMPETENCY
These cases underscore -the -importance of looking to the specific
beneficial significance of the mind-influencing drugs. The court, in-
terested in the question of mental competency to stand -trial, should
be concerned only with the kind and degree of drug influence, irre-
spective of the purposes for which the drugs are used. Drugs, in other
words, may be necessary to attain mental competency to stand trial,
and -the courts should be concerned with this mental state as the end
result rather than with the means whereby it is produced. Similarly,
the courts should be concerned with the mental state resulting from
the non-use of a necessary drug as this relates to and affects mental
competency to stand -trial.
Some courts, as previously noted, have erroneously believed that the
use of psychopharmaceutical agents automatically leads to mental in-
competence for trial purposes; 3 9 that such is surely not the case can
be seen from those cases in which -the non-use of such agents may
itself lead to mental incompetence. There are few cases on this point,
but those reported have. adopted this reasonable approach. It is im-
portant to recognize that in all of these cases the necessary -treatment
or non-treatment was under the control of representatives of the crimi-
nal justice system.
In Sewell v. Lainson,40 the Supreme Court of Iowa took judicial
notice -that an opium addict is nerve wracked and mentally ill when
denied the drug and -that he approaches mental normalcy only when
he has access to the opiate. 4 ' Petitioner was an opium addict for
twenty-five years'42 and testified that, if he did not obtain his usual dos-
age, he became illM 11 He requested the sheriff at -the county jail to ob-
tain morphine for his use during incarceration. 44  About thirty or
forty minutes before -the hearing at which he entered his plea of guilty,
the sheriff came to his cell and gave him 3/ grains of morphine which
the addict administered to himself by hypodermic injection. 45 Peti-
Length of Hospitalization Before and After Tranquilizers, 9 CAN. PSYCHrATRY Ass'N J. 43
(1964). The misuse of these potent substances may produce psychological states not
contemplated by the manufacturers. A defendant may deliberately misuse such psycho-
logically-active agents to produce a state of mind so disturbed that he is mentally in-
competent. See People v. Rogers, 150 Cal. App. 2d 403, 309 P.2d 949 (1957), for a
startling example of this type of drug misuse.
139. See text accompanying note 71 supra.
140. 57 N.W.2d 556 (Iowa 1953).
141. Id. at 559.
142. Id. at 558.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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tioner later contended that the court erred in finding he was not under
the influence of narcotic drugs at the time of the hearing and entry
of his plea of guilty.146  The court, in taking judicial notice that an
opium addict is ill when denied the drug,4 7 stated that, if the opium
had not been furnished to petitioner, he would have been before the
court "with much more cause, complaining that his plea of guilty was
entered when he was not mentally competent to realize what he was
doing because of the nervous and other physical sufferings occasioned
by deprival of his habitual narcotic."'- 48 Thus, the court found that non-
use of the narcotic would have had a deleterious effect. Rather than
automatically and fatally condemning the use of a mind-influencing
agent, the court correctly looked -to the beneficial effects of the drug.
It is obvious -that in cases such as Sewell the state is faced with a
dilemma. Addicts deprived of their narcotics may experience with-
drawal symptoms so severe that they are physically and mentally in-
capacitated from meaningfully following the evidence produced at trial
or from cooperating rationally with counsel. The defendant might
become so preoccupied with his real or imagined suffering as to lose
all interest in his case and desire only that the trial or hearing end
as quickly as possible. Thus, deprival of mind-improving psychophar-
maceutical drugs, with such deprivation involuntarily imposed upon a
defendant in custody, may be a basis for allegations of mental incompe-
tency. Yet, the defendant's receipt of such agents, as in Sewell, might
be the basis of an identical claim of mental incompetency. It becomes
obvious that legal concern should be not with the use or non-use of
drugs, but rather with their effect on the defendant's capacity to attain
the standard for mental competency to stand trial.
The same problems are present when ,the detained defendant suf-
fers from a mental illness to 'the extent that he requires appropriate
mind-influencing drugs as psychotropic medication. Specific medica-
tion may be prescribed to alleviate clinical symptoms of a mental ill-
ness which might otherwise be so severely incapacitating that the de-
fendant-patient would not possess the mental capacity to stand trial.
The treating physician must be aware that his decision to prescribe
medication is not only a psychiatric decision, but also one that has medi-
cal-legal implications and is affected by variables other than those that
direct patient treatment.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 559.
148. Id. See Hansford v. United States, 365 F.2d 920, 923 (D.C. Cir. 1966), where
Judge Bazelon stated that a competency hearing is constitutionally required if it appears
that a defendant may be suffering from withdrawal symptoms during trial.
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The severity of side effects of the drug and their special significance
for mental competency must be considered by -the psychiatrist when
the patient-defendant goes to bar. Because of -the absence of well-
established medical criteria of drug effects on competency, the psy-
chiatrist's clinical acumen is -taxed by his need -to evaluate and predict
the effects of -the drug upon the defendant's competency to stand trial.
The psychiatrist must be familiar with the possible side effects of the
drug. Because of variable responses of patients to medication, the
psychiatrist must examine the defendant with the interview directed
toward evaluating his mental functioning as it relates -to the issue of
mental competency.
149
Many patients receiving psychiatric medication are able to function
successfully in their customary daily activities as a consequence of their
maintenance dosage of drugs. To varying degrees -these drugs sup-
press the signs and symptoms of their mental illness and may even
hold previously overt psychotic symptomatology in complete remission.
Courts have questioned the defendant's mental competency to stand
trial when he is receiving a therapeutic maintenance dose of medica-
tion which produces a remission of the very symptoms which would
otherwise cause that defendant to be adjudicated as mentally incom-
petent to stand trial.150  Such reasoning by these courts is inconsistent
with contemporary psychiatric knowledge.
Most courts adjudicate the question of 'the use of psychotropic medi-
cation in order to eliminate psychotic symptomatology by following -the
reasoning of the court in State v. Rand.'5' The court there held that
a defendant is competent to stand trial "under properly administered
tranquilizing drugs'"'5 that enable him to confer with his attorneys in
a manner which meets the test set forth in Dusky. 53
In cases such as Rand, drugs are needed to induce improvement
in the mental state, and not to prevent debilitating withdrawal effects.
In Rand, as in Sewell, -the court properly looked -to the effect of use
or non-use of the mind-influencing drug and found that appropriate
drug use was necessary to engender mental competence to stand trial.
The focus of legal concern in all such cases is the same: What
are the psychiatric effects of the drugs on the defendant? Will the
149. Haddox & Pollack, Psychopharmaceutical Restoration to Present Sanity (Mental
Competency to Stand Trial), 17 J. Fop. Sc. 568, 575-76 (1972).
150. See text accompanying note 71 supra.
151. 247 N.E.2d 342 (Ohio 1969).
152. Id. at 349.
153. Id. See the discussion of the Dusky standard in the text accompanying notes
15-64 supra.
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use of the drug induce mental competency or produce mental in-
competency; and will the non-use of the drug promote mental com-
petency or produce incompetency?
The courts appear to be especially critical of inadequate treatment
of detained defendants whose mental impairment would render them
mentally incompetent to stand trial unless they were to receive ade-
quate and appropriate psychotropic medication.
CONCLUSION
Mental competency to stand -trial is -the most frequently litigated
psychiatric-legal issue in criminal law.154 Courts have directed them-
selves to a clarification of the issue by attempting to identify the thresh-
old level of mental impairment that would disqualify a defendant
from being mentally competent to stand trial. The Dusky standard
is the best expression of a base line definition for mental incompetency
to stand trial. It excludes a defendant from being mentally compe-
tent to stand trial when he demonstrates mental incapacity either to
consult with his counsel with -a reasonable degree of rational under-
standing or to have a rational as well as a factual understanding of
the proceedings against him. The defendant's capacity for rational
understanding can thus be set as the critical threshold level differenti-
ating mental competency from mental incompetency for trial pur-
poses. The critical -threshold for rational understanding -that would
disqualify the defendant from mental competency to stand trial is de-
scribed as -the inability of a defendant to reason logically from readily
identified valid, simple premises to logical, simple conclusions. This
critical threshold level of mental impairment must be reached before
the presumption of mental competency -to stand trial is rebutted.
Using the above identified criteria courts have directed thbmselves
to clarifying the effect of drug use and non-use on mental impairment
for purposes of standing trial and have also directed attention to the
manner in which mental impairment was produced. A survey of cases
involving mental competency to stand trial indicates that the courts are
becoming increasingly concerned with the effects of the use or non-
use of drugs rather than with the mere fact of such use or non-use.
154. Manual, supra note 5, at 1.
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